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Abstract
A huge literature shows that childhood health and educational attainment are highly
correlated. However, estimates for the effect of childhood health on educational
attainment under risk generally confound the effect of liquidity constraints and of
lack of insurance against risk. It is unclear whether the correlation between health
and education under uninsured risk would remain if the capital markets were perfect
and household faced no liquidity constraints. This paper fills in this lacuna in the
literature. We develop a two period model of investment in education when future
labor earnings are stochastically dependent on current investments in schooling and
health. It is found that when there is uninsured risk, then parental investment in a
child’s education will be inefficient even in the presence of perfect capital markets.
Under certain assumptions, there will be a positive correlation between childhood
health and educational investment. Health inequalities will translate into educational
inequalities in an environment of uninsured risk. We are able to show that when
perfect insurance markets are present, investments in child health and schooling will
be optimal. From the policy perspective, this argues for the development of
insurance markets. The results also suggest that policy interventions that target
higher levels of educational investment among the population need to account for
the effect of childhood differences in health.
JEL Classification: O12, O16, O20
1 Introduction
Grantham-McGregor et al. (2007) estimate that more than 200 million children under
5 years of age fail to reach their potential in cognitive development because of poverty,
poor health and nutrition, and deficient care. The positive correlation between health and
education has also been highlighted by a number of empirical economic studies (see
Grossman and Kaestner (1997) for a review). This correlation is robust even after con-
trolling for different measures of socio-economic status, such as income and race, and re-
gardless of whether health levels are measured by mortality rates, self-reported health
status, or physiological indicators of health. More recently, Mayer-Foulkes (2003) pro-
vides evidence from Mexico that childhood nutrition and health as well as parental edu-
cation have substantial and possibly increasing returns in the acquisition of education as
measured by school permanence. The poor are less able to invest in human capital, and
constituent elements for a low human capital trap or for a prolonged transition in inter-
generational human capital accumulation are present in Mexico.
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The correlation between health and educational attainment has also been tackled the-
oretically. For instance, Edwards and Grossman (1977) develop a model of childhood
health and cognitive development to study the effect of parents’ income and other vari-
ables on a child’s subsequent health and cognitive development. Their model is devel-
oped on the lines of analyses of inter-generational transfers (e.g., Becker (1967, 1974))
and allows them to analyze whether poor health in childhood adversely affects cogni-
tive development of the child. Their key insight is that to understand the behavior of
parents with respect to the child’s health and development, it is important to distin-
guish low-income families from high-income families. In a recent paper, Galor and
Mayer-Foulkes (2002) develop an overlapping generation model in which they focus on
the effects of minimal health requirements for acquiring an education. They show that
when families do not have enough resources to invest in the satisfaction of basic needs
and health care, and finance is not available for this purpose, a poverty trap may exist
with low health, education, and income. This approach adds to the literature that ex-
plains the persistence of poverty through the presence of credit constraints. However,
both Edwards and Grossman (1977) and Galor and Mayer-Foulkes (2002) make no as-
sumption that the returns to investment in child health and cognitive development are
stochastic. Consequently, their approach is inappropriate in an environment of insur-
ance market failures.
An entire branch of development economics deals with the effect of widespread risk
and market failures on investment decisions by poor households in developing countries.
It is argued that uninsured risk is a cause rather than just being an aspect of poverty. A
number of studies have found that in the presence of uninsured risk, investment decisions
by households will be inefficient. For instance, Jacoby and Skoufias (1997) estimate the ef-
fect of financial market imperfections on child school attendance using panel data from
India. They find that seasonal fluctuations in school attendance are a form of self-
insurance, i.e., households withdraw children from school when they experience a nega-
tive income shock. Moreover, a few empirical studies analyze the effect of childhood
health on educational attainment within a stochastic setting (e.g., Alderman et al. (2001);
Gan and Gong (2007)).
However, mathematical models of investment in human capital under risk typically
focus on a household’s decision to invest in education or health rather than situate the
effect of risk on the interlinkages from education to health. Moreover, often, the effect
of credit market failures on the health-education correlation cannot be distinguished
from the effect of insurance market failures. This is the lacuna which this paper aims to
fill up.
The model in this paper is developed by linking and extending existing models of in-
vestment in health and education. For instance, consider the seminal paper by Levhari
and Weiss (1974) on the effect of risk on a household’s decision to invest in education.
Levhari and Weiss show that under the assumption of decreasing absolute risk averse
preferences, investment in education will be positively correlated with a household’s
initial income level. In this paper, we follow Levhari and Weiss closely by adopting their
framework of a two-period model where in the first period, a household invests in a
child’s education and, in the second period, it receives stochastically determined returns
on that investment. However, we also extend the model developed by Levhari and
Weiss by adding another dimension to human capital investment, that is, health.
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Investment in health has been modelled in interesting ways in the literature. In Gross-
man’s (1972) model, individuals demand health for two reasons. As a consumption com-
modity, health enters directly into their utility functions, and as an investment
commodity, health determines the total amount of time available for work in the market
sector of the economy, where consumers produce money earnings, and for work in the
non-market or household sector, where they produce commodities that enter their utility
function. Typically, risk is introduced into the consumption or investment versions of
Grossman’s (1972) model of demand for health (see Grossman (1999) for a review). For
instance, Dardanoni and Wagstaff (1990) introduce uncertainty into the pure consump-
tion version of Grossman’s model, and Cropper (1977), Muurinen (1982), Dardanoni and
Wagstaff (1987), Selden (1993), and Chang (1996) introduce uncertainty into the pure in-
vestment version of Grossman’s model. In line with the latter group of studies, we ignore
the consumption motive for spending on health and assume that individuals demand
health purely as an investment commodity. This helps to focus our analysis.
As we will see below, our approach of analyzing the effect of health on education in a
stochastic framework offers a new interpretation for the empirically observed positive
correlation between health and education. Typically, the observed positive correlation
between health and schooling is explained in one of the following three ways. First, it is
argued that there is causal relationship that runs from increases in schooling to in-
creases in health. Education improves health by raising economic conditions in per
capita income terms so that a higher expenditure in health is possible and/or by in-
creasing knowledge of health issues (Grossman 1975; Kenkel 1991; Rosenzweig and
Schultz 1991). Second, it is argued that the causal relationship runs from increases in
health to increases in schooling rather than the other way around. Healthier students
are more efficient at studying (Perri 1984; Currie and Hyson 1999). Better health may
also increase the demand for education because of longer life expectancy (Gan and
Gong 2004). Third, it is argued that no causal relationship is implied by the correlation
between health and education. Instead, differences in one or more third variables, such
as physical and mental ability, parental characteristics, and time discount rates (Fuchs,
1982), affect both health and schooling in the same direction.
In this paper, we construct a sufficiently general framework to capture the interplay
between health and cognitive development under risk. This approach allows us to infer
that in the presence of uninsured risk, part of the correlation between health and edu-
cation will reflect the effect of risk on household investment decisions. The remainder
of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents and discusses the model. Section 3
analyzes the optimal level of health and education investments under perfect insurance
markets. Section 4 concludes.
2 Conceptual framework
2.1 The model
Consider a unitary household model with an adult and a child. There are two time pe-
riods, the first (present) and the second (future). In the first period, adult income (Y)
and child wages (W) are the two sources of household income. Also, in the first period,
the adult makes the decision to invest in the child’s education and health. In the second
period, income accrues from the interest earned on household savings in the first
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period and as a function of the child’s human capital (education and health) accumu-
lated in the first period. The two period utility function is represented by U(C1, C2),
where C1 denotes consumption in the first period and C2 denotes consumption in the
second period. We assume that the inter-temporal utility function U(C1, C2) is addi-
tively separable over time and states of the world with discount rate β(< 1) and is sub-
ject to an inter-temporal budget constraint relating assets in the current period to
assets in the previous period, current expenditure and current income. Also, we assume
that U(C1, C2) is at least three times continuously differentiable and possesses every-
where positive and diminishing marginal utilities (U ' (C) > 0; U ' ' (C) < 0).
Investments in health and education are time-consuming. A is the proportion of the
first period time devoted to schooling, and M is the proportion of the first period time
devoted to health. We assume that the opportunity cost of child’s time is the only cost
associated with investments in health and schooling. There are no direct costs of
schooling and health. Investment in health and education in the second period is iden-
tically zero. We ignore leisure—both of the child and of the adult. Future earnings π(.)
depend on current investments in health and education and on the future (unknown)
state of the world θ where θ is a random variable with a known distribution. We as-
sume that the income-generating function π(.) is concave in its arguments.
This is illustrated as follows:
U C1; C2ð Þ ¼ U C1ð Þ þ βEV C2ð Þ
where
C2 ¼ Y þ W  1 – A –Mð Þ− C1ð Þ  1 þ rð Þ þ π D; H ; θð Þ
H ¼ H0 þ M
D ¼ D0 þ A
H0 is the initial or childhood health endowment, and H is the stock of health in the
second period. D0 is the initial or childhood endowment of cognitive ability, and D is
the stock of cognitive development in the second period. This is a simple representa-
tion of the maximization problem, as we do not (yet) allow for interplay between health
and cognitive development. We will see later that many interesting results are obtained
by allowing for alternative technologies for the second period income-generating func-
tion. For instance, we can either assume that health and education are jointly deter-
mined or assume that health and education are substitutes in the second period
income-generating function.
Another crucial assumption that we make at this point is that the capital markets are
perfect and the household faces no liquidity constraints. In essence, we are interested
in capturing the effect of insurance market failures on household decision to invest in a
risky asset. It is well established that when financial markets are complete, investment
decisions are solely determined by rates of return. However, when markets are incom-
plete or imperfect, separation of consumption and human capital investment decisions
no longer holds and investment decisions will be influenced by family resources.
In the context of our model, it is assumed that the child is born with an endowment
of health and cognitive ability and these endowments as well as first period investments
in the child’s health and education together enter as arguments into the second period
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income-generating function. In what follows, we will simplify our model to focus on a
household’s decision to invest in the child’s education and within the context of that
maximization problem try to understand the impact of the child’s health endowment
on investment in education. We will initially assume that investment in education is
risky and the risk is increasing in the level of investment in education. We will show
that there will be a positive correlation between childhood health and household invest-
ment in the child’s education.
Notice that this result is dependent on the assumption of increasing risk which is sat-
isfied if the risk parameter in the income-generating function is multiplicative. If, how-
ever, the risk parameter in the income-generating function is additive, then that would
be akin to the assumption of decreasing risk and the results would be different. We will
discuss more on this later in the paper. For the moment, we assume that risk in the
second period income-generating function is multiplicative, and thus, the assumption
of increasing risk with an increase in household investment in education is satisfied.
Let us consider the second period income-generating function in some detail. The ar-
guments of the second period income-generating function are the second period stocks
of health and education. We have already noted the important assumption of multi-
plicative risk for our analysis. Now, we will also state some assumptions for the effects
of changes in health and education stocks on the second period income. We assume
that the marginal productivity of education and health is positive in income. Thus, we
have that πD > 0 and πH > 0. We assume that πHDθ = 0. In other words, the change in
marginal productivity of education with respect to health does not vary with the param-
eter of risk.
To sum up, a household is a portfolio investor that invests in financial assets (which
have a safe and constant rate of return), education, and health. The household’s
maximization problem is represented as follows:
MaxC1A;M U C1ð Þ þ βEV C2ð Þ
where
C2 ¼ Y þ W  1 – A – Mð Þ– C1ð Þ  1 þ rð Þ þ π D;H ; θð Þ
This is a very general framework. We consider specific cases for analytical conveni-
ence. First, we are interested in capturing the effect of childhood endowment of health
H0 on the investment in education A by a household.
3 Optimal level of investment
In this section, we will present a definition of optimal level of investment in human
capital and also analytically prove that in the presence of perfect insurance markets,
household investment will be optimal. Optimality under perfect insurance and credit
markets can be interpreted in terms of the first welfare theorem. The first welfare the-
orem suggests that competitive markets result in equilibrium in a Pareto efficient allo-
cation so that no one can be made better off without at least one person being made
worse off. When there is a credit or insurance market failure, the first welfare theorem
fails to hold and household investment in risky assets will be at sub-optimal levels or
inefficient.
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Let us start with the definition of certainty. We follow Levhari and Weiss (1974) and
interpret certainty in two alternative ways. First, we interpret it to mean that the future
income of the individual is equal to its expected value. Alternatively, we interpret cer-
tainty to mean that the state of the world is known.
Mathematically, we represent the two definitions of certainty as follows:
a. y1 = E(y1) or π(A,H0) = E(π(A,H0, θ))
where π(A,H0) is the future earnings function of the individual.
And
b. State of the world is known, θ = θ0
where θ0 is chosen so as to equate the marginal productivity of investment in human
capital under certainty with the expected marginal productivity under uncertainty.
E π A;H0; θð Þð Þ ¼ π A;H0; θ0ð Þ
Next, we consider the effect of the presence of an insurance market. This is discussed
as follows.
Proposition 1 If a household has access to competitive insurance markets where they
can contract at rate Δ = θ − 1 per unit of human capital, returns to human capital are
continuous random variables, savings are interior, and human capital investment will
be optimal.
Proof. First, we show that expected profit of insurance company is zero. And second,
we derive the condition that given the availability of an insurance contract, a household
will maximize subject to the same constraints as it would were there no risk. The profit
Π of the insurance company is defined as:
Y
¼ Δπ A;H0ð Þ
Taking expectations,
E Πð Þ ¼ E Δð Þπ A;H0ð Þ ¼ 0
as E (Δ) = E(θ) − 1 = 1 − 1 = 0 and π(A,H0) is predetermined.
Next, we show that with the provision of insurance, the constraint in the household
optimization problem is reduced to the one without risk.
Without insurance, the second period consumption is
C2 ¼ π A;H0ð Þθ þ Y þW 1 −Að Þ−C1ð Þ  1 þ rð Þ−Δπ A;H0ð Þ
With insurance, the second period consumption is
C2 ¼ π A;H0ð Þθ þ Y þW 1 −Að Þ−C1ð Þ  1 þ rð Þ−Δπ A;H0ð Þ
¼ π A;H0ð Þ þ Y þW 1 −Að Þ−C1ð Þ  1 þ rð Þ
which is the consumption without risk. Thus, the human capital investment decisions
will be optimal when insurance against risk is available.
We will now see that in the presence of uninsured risk, a household’s decision to in-
vest in a risky asset will be inefficient. The household investment will be at sub-optimal
levels.
We assume for simplicity that initial childhood cognitive ability is zero and that
household investment in child health is zero. Therefore, the household’s decision prob-
lem is reduced to investment in the financial assets (safe) and investment in the child’s
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education (risky). Under these assumptions, the arguments of our second period
income-generating function are H0 and A. The maximization problem is as follows:
MaxC1;A U C1ð Þ þ βEV Y þ W 1 − Að Þ– C1ð Þ  1 þ rð Þ þ π A; H0ð Þ~θ
 
The first-order conditions are
U′ C1ð Þ− βEV ′ C2ð Þ  1 þ rð Þ ¼ 0 ð1Þ
−Wβ 1 þ rð ÞEV ′ C2ð Þ þ βπAEV ′ C2~θ
 
¼ 0 ð2Þ
From Eq. (1), we can infer that no gain can be achieved by transferring consumption
from period to period. Also, from Eq. (2), we can infer that at the optimum, the ex-
pected marginal (in utility terms) rates of return from physical capital and education
must be equal. We assume that an interior solution such that 0 < A < 1 is attained.
Next, let us rewrite Eq. (2). This is as follows:
E V ′ πAθ −W 1 þ rð ÞÞ ¼ 0ðð
This plus the definition of covariance yields
Cov v′; πAθ −W 1 þ rð Þð Þ þ E v′ð Þ  E πAθ −W 1 þ rð Þð Þ ¼ 0
We can rearrange terms in the above equation to give us the following expression:







Cov v′;πAθð Þ < 0
This implies that the household invests in the child’s education such that the ex-
pected return on that education is pushed above the return on physical capital. In other
words, when the expected marginal rate of return from education exceeds that of phys-
ical capital, it is indicated that the individual views human capital as more risky on the
margin. That is, a marginal increase in the level of investment in human capital in-
creases the variance of future earnings and consumption.
Let us compare the above first-order conditions with those that would be obtained if
the consumer faced no uncertainty with regard to an investment in education. When θ
is non-stochastic or there is no risk, the appropriate first-order conditions are the
following:
U′ C1ð Þ−β 1 þ rð ÞEV ′ C2ð Þ ¼ 0
W 1 þ rð Þ ¼ πA
Comparison of the above first-order condition with that under the uncertainty ver-
sion of the model reveals that the latter differs from the former only through the pres-
ence of the covariance term Cov(v ′; πAθ). It is interesting to note that the presence of
this term in the first-order condition means that the educational investment in period 1
will depend inter alia on the initial health endowment, H0. This is because V ′ (.) is a
function of H0, and therefore, the covariance between V ′ and θ will also be a function
of H0.
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Furthermore, by our assumptions that the market rate of interest is constant and in-
vestment in the financial market is risk free, we can imagine the household as an in-
vestor who makes a portfolio choice between investment in risk-free savings and risky
education. This model is a variant of Arrow’s (1965) model of portfolio selection.
To see this, rewrite the first-order Eq. (2) as the following:
E V ′ C2ð Þ  πAθ−W 1 þ rð Þð Þð Þ ¼ 0 ð3Þ
Let
πAθ−W 1 þ rð Þ ¼ G θð Þ ð4Þ
Combining (3) and (4), we get
E V ′ C2ð Þ  G θð Þð Þ ¼ 0 ð5Þ
Looking at Eq. (5) above, resemblance to Arrow’s first-order condition is apparent.
Arrow’s model can be summarized as follows. An investor faces a choice between a
risky asset and a risk-free asset. The return to the risk-free asset is zero. The return to
the risky asset is a random variable X, which assumes both positive and negative values.
Let A and a be, respectively, the initial wealth and the amount of wealth invested in the
risky asset. The investor maximizes the expected utility E(U(Y)) of stochastic income Y
=A + aX by choosing an optimal portfolio. The investment in the risky asset is positive
if and only if E(X) > 0. The first-order condition for an interior solution is E(U ′ (Y)X) =
0, and the income elasticity of the risky asset has the same sign as E(U ′ ′ (Y)X). The
celebrated result is that the sign of E(U ′ ′ (Y)X) is positive and, therefore, the demand
for the risky asset is a normal good, if the utility function U(Y) exhibits decreasing ab-
solute risk aversion. In proposition 1 below, we will assume decreasing absolute risk
averse preferences and prove that an increase in childhood health increases the house-
hold investment in child’s education. This result is an income effect coming from the
fact that an increase in childhood health endowment implies some increase in expected
future income. There is, however, a fundamental difference between this model and
that of Arrow’s. In Arrow’s model, the distribution of the rate of return is independent
of the amount invested. He called such an assumption stochastic constant returns to
scale. In this model, there are two random variables: θ, the source of uncertainty, and
G(θ), the rate of return to the risky asset. The assumption of stochastic constant
returns to scale does not apply to the rate of return G(θ).
Proposition 2 Under the assumption of decreasing absolute risk averse preferences, an
increase in childhood health endowment will encourage investment in education when
there is risk associated with the second period income-generating function.
Proof. In the Appendix.
Next, we are interested in capturing the effect of childhood endowment of cognitive
ability on a household’s decision to invest in the child’s health. For simplicity, we as-
sume that H0 = 0; A = 0 instead of assuming D0 = 0; M = 0 (as we did for deriving the
proposition 1). This implies that the arguments of our period 2 income-generating
function are D0 and M. The maximization problem is as follows:
MaxC1;M U C1ð Þ þ βEV Y þ W 1−Mð Þ−C1ð Þ  1 þ rð Þ þ π M;D0ð Þ~θ
 
We can prove the following proposition.
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Proposition 3 Under the assumption of decreasing absolute risk averse preferences, an
increase in cognitive ability will encourage investment in health when there is risk asso-
ciated with the second period income-generating function.
Proof. In the Appendix.
In presenting our model, we have focused on the important cross-effects, namely, the
effect of childhood health endowment on investment in education (proposition 2) and
the effect of childhood cognitive ability on investment in health (proposition 3).
A crucial assumption that we make in proving the propositions 1 and 2 is that the
rate of return on financial assets is constant. When the rate of return is variable, then
an increase in rate of return could invert sign of the relation between investment in
education and the initial health endowment.
4 Alternative technological assumptions
In this section, we will first follow Edwards and Grossman (1977) and develop a specifi-
cation to capture the interdependence between health and cognitive development. Let
us assume that the inputs into production of second period stock of education are the
investment in education in the first period and the initial or childhood health endow-
ment. Also, assume that the inputs into production of second period stock of health
are the investment in health in the first period and the initial or childhood cognitive
ability endowment. Clearly, this is a more general form of the production functions for
health and education and allows for the interplay between health and education. It also
allows for the possibility that a low childhood health endowment will adversely affect
the cognitive development of the child.
Our context is as follows. The second period stock of health H is given by the initial
childhood health endowment plus a production function for health that transforms the
inputs into the child’s health into the second period stock of health. The health produc-
tion function is I(M,H0,D0). Similarly, the second period stock of cognitive develop-
ment D is given by the initial childhood cognitive ability plus a production function for
education that transforms the inputs into the child’s education into the second period
stock of education. The education production function is Q(A,H0,D0). We assume that
QH0 > 0 and ID0 > 0. These assumptions are akin to Cunha et al.’s (2005) assumptions
of universal self-productivity or recursive productivity. The assumption QH0 > 0 im-
plies that the level of initial childhood health has a positive effect on the production of
the second period stock of cognitive development. We can think of health as enabling
the formation of child quality in the early years and throughout youth, bringing the effi-
ciency of education to a viable level, by raising skilled and unskilled labor efficiency and
through longevity, itself influenced by early health, by lengthening the time during
which education will yield a return. The assumption ID0 > 0 implies that the level of
initial cognitive ability has a positive effect on the production of the second period
stock of health. We can think of this in terms of the efficiency effect discussed by
Grossman (1999). The efficiency effect can take two forms: productive efficiency and al-
locative efficiency. Productive efficiency pertains to a situation in which the more edu-
cated obtain a larger health output from given amounts of endogenous (choice) inputs.
Allocative efficiency pertains to a situation in which schooling increases information
about the true effects of the input on health (Kenkel 2000). Allocative efficiency will
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improve health to the extent that it leads to the selection of a better input mix. Further-
more, our formulation is sufficiently general to allow cross-effects of initial endow-
ments of health or schooling ability on investments into schooling and health,
respectively. This is akin to the concept of universal direct complementarity of invest-
ments (Cunha et al. 2005) and implies that ∂
2Q
∂A∂H0
> 0. This means that higher levels of
childhood health increase the productivity of investment in education. The model now
becomes
U C1;C2ð Þ ¼ U C1ð Þ þ βEV C2ð Þ
where
C2 ¼ Y þ W  1−A−Mð ÞC1ð Þ  1 þ rð Þ þ π D;H ; θð Þ
H ¼ H0 þ I M;H0;D0ð Þ
D ¼ D0 þ Q A;H0;D0ð Þ
where H denotes the stock of health in the second period. H0 is the endowment of
health that the child is born with in period 1. I is the technology that converts the in-
vestment in child health in the first period into net additions to health stock over the
two period time framework. Similarly, D0 is the endowment of cognitive ability that the
child is born with in period 1. Q is the technology that converts the investment in child
schooling in the first period into net additions to education stock over the two time
periods.
This specification allows for interplay between health and development, and in par-
ticular, it allows for the possibility that low initial health levels will affect the realized
level of cognitive development. We will analyze the effect of initial health endowment
on subsequent cognitive development. Note that the initial stocks of health and devel-
opment (H0,D0) are included in the production functions of both I and G. While no as-
sumption is made at this time with respect to the directional effects of these initial
stocks on I and G, this flexible specification allows for a number of possibilities. For ex-
ample, the effect of medical care inputs on changes in health may be greater when an
individual’s stock of health is at a lower level (i.e., ∂I/∂H0 < 0). Or, children with greater
inherited intellectual ability may augment that ability more easily (i.e., ∂Q/∂D0 < 0). Fi-
nally, we reiterate our assumption that risk in the second period income-generating
function, π(A,H, θ), is multiplicative in nature. The assumption of multiplicative risk
can be interpreted as capturing the effect of risk on the returns to (rather than stocks
of ) health and educational investments incorporated in the income-generating
function.
In this context, under our assumption of perfect capital markets, we can imagine the
household as an investor allocating his portfolio between health, education, and savings.
The household maximization problem in this case becomes
MaxC1; A;M U C1ð Þ þ βEV C2ð Þ
where
C2 ¼ Y þW  1 −A −Mð Þ−C1ð Þ  1 þ rð Þ þ π D; H ; θð Þ
H ¼ H0 þ I M;H0;D0ð Þ
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D ¼ D0 þ Q A; H0;D0ð Þ
The corresponding first-order conditions (FOC) are as follows:
U′ C1ð Þ−βEV ′ :ð Þ  1 þ rð Þ ¼ 0
−β  1 þ rð Þ  EV ′ :ð Þ þ βE V ′θð Þ  πDQA ¼ 0
−β  1 þ rð Þ  EV ′ :ð Þ þ βE V ′θð Þ  πHIM ¼ 0
Looking at the first FOC, we can infer that no gain can be achieved by transferring
consumption from period to period. The second FOC means that at the optimum, the
expected marginal (in utility terms) rates of return from physical capital and education
must be equal. The third FOC means that at the optimum, the expected marginal (in
utility terms) rates of return from physical capital and health must be equal. We as-
sume that interior solutions such that 0 <A < 1 and 0 <M < 1 are attained. We can also
show that the following proposition will hold for the above context.
Proposition 4 If education and health are jointly determined inputs into the income-
generating function in the second period, then there will be a positive correlation be-
tween initial health endowment and educational investment even in the absence of risk.
Assuming decreasing absolute risk averse preferences, this positive correlation will be ex-
acerbated in the presence of risk.
Proof. Similar to earlier proofs for propositions 2 and 3.
In the above specification, we allowed for interdependence between health and edu-
cation investments. Alternatively, let us assume that health and education investments
are substitutes in the income-generating function. Such a specification, in general
terms, would imply a functional form such as the following:
π A þ γMð Þ
In the above specification, health and education are assumed to be substitutes in the
income-generating function subject to a scaling factor given by γ where 0 < γ < 1.
Now, consider the maximization problem with health and education as substitutes in
the income-generating function. Let us assume the maximization problem is
MaxC1; A U C1ð Þ þ βEV Y þW  1 −Að Þ −C1ð Þ  1 þ rð Þ þ π f Að Þ þ H0θð Þð Þ
The first-order conditions are as follows:
U′ C1ð Þ−βEV ′ C2ð Þ  1 þ rð Þ ¼ 0
−Wβ  1 þ rð Þ  EV ′ C2ð Þ þ βπf f AEV ′ C2ð Þ ¼ 0
Rewriting the second of the two first-order conditions above, we get
E πAf Að Þ ¼ W 1 þ rð Þ –




Cov v′; πf f A
 
> 0
The covariance term in the above equation is positive, so that risk averse individuals
push the expected rate of return below the safe rate, increasing their investment in edu-
cation. This positive relation makes educational investment relatively more valuable
Kumra IZA Journal of Labor & Development  (2017) 6:2 Page 11 of 22
than saving, which has a safe but uncorrelated return. The results above plus an as-
sumption of declining absolute risk aversion lead us to the result that dAdH0 < 0. This is
proven by means of the proposition below.
Proposition 5 If education and health enter as additive components of the income-
generating function in the second period, then risk associated with the exogenous health
endowment will cause the level of investment in education to decline with an increase in
health endowment.
Proof. In the Appendix. Similar to earlier proofs for propositions 2 and 3.
Given this formulation of uncertainty, those born with a low level of childhood health
endowment will invest more in their education than those born with a high level of
childhood health endowment (assuming similar initial levels of schooling ability). In
other words, it is risky for those poor in health in this framework not to invest on
education.
Let us look at an alternative specification for the second period income-generating
function. The maximization problem is denoted as follows:
MaxC1; A U C1ð Þ þ βEV Y þW  1 −Að Þ −C1ð Þ  1 þ rð Þ þ π f Að Þ þ π H0ð Þθð Þð Þ
The first-order conditions are as follows:
U′ C1ð Þ−βEV ′ C2ð Þ  1 þ rð Þ ¼ 0
−Wβ  1 þ rð Þ  EV ′ C2ð Þ þ βf AEV ′ C2ð Þ ¼ 0
Rewriting the second of the two first-order conditions above, we get
E f Að Þ ¼ W 1 þ rð Þ–
Cov v′; f Að Þ
EV ′
where
Cov v′; f ′ð Þ ¼ 0
In this framework, the level of risk affects the household consumption decisions but
household production decisions are left unaffected. The optimal level of educational in-
vestment will be given by equating the returns to education to the alternative cost of
educational investment. The optimal level of education is not a function of the level of
initial health endowment. This is the special case when fAθ = 0 uniformly or equiva-
lently f(A, θ) = f(A) + θ
It is immediately seen from the first-order condition that
f ′
W ¼ 1 þ r, for all states of the world.
For this specification, we can prove the following proposition.
Proposition 6 If the returns to education are certain and separable from the returns to
health, then the optimal level of investment in education will not vary with the level of
exogenous health endowment, when there is risk associated with the stock of health.
Proof. On similar lines as the earlier proofs for propositions 2 and 3.
5 Imperfect capital markets
Suppose that the capital market is imperfect. The household faces liquidity constraints
and can invest only in health and in education. The household decision problem is re-
duced to that of investing in health or education rather than the earlier specification of
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investment in three assets, namely, savings, health, and education. The following prop-
osition can be proven.
Proposition 7 If the capital market is imperfect so that a household either invests in
schooling or health but does not invest in financial assets, then a risk associated with
the second period income-generating function will cause the separability assumption to
fail and children born with a high health endowment will receive more investment in
their health as well as education.
Proof. In the Appendix.
6 Conclusions
We have seen above that uninsured risk will lead to inefficient household decisions.
Specifically, there will be a positive correlation between childhood health endowment
and household investment in a child’s education in the presence of uninsured risk. In
so far as this contributes to lower educational attainment and thus to lower future
productivity, this self insurance strategy may perpetuate poverty and under-
development. The policy implications of the above analysis therefore point to the im-
portant role for development of insurance markets in developing countries. Risk reduc-
tion measures such as provision of health services, micro-insurance, and microfinance
should be considered to reduce household vulnerability and help them cope better with
the effects of shocks.
Appendix
6.1 Proof of proposition 2
MaxC1; A U C1ð Þ þ βEV Y þW 1−Að Þ−C1ð Þ  1 þ rð Þ þ π A;H0ð Þθð Þ
The first-order conditions (FOCs) are as follows:
U′ C1ð Þ−β 1 þ rð ÞEV ′ :ð Þ ¼ 0
βEV ′ :ð Þ  −W 1 þ rð Þ þ πAθð Þ ¼ 0
Totally differentiating the above FOCs with respect to C1, A, and H0, we get
U′′ C1ð Þ þ β 1þ rð Þ2EV ′′ :ð Þ
   dC1
þ β 1þ rð Þ2W  EV ′′ :ð Þ−β 1þ rð ÞπAEV ′′ θð Þ
   dAþ −β 1 þ rð ÞπH0EV ′′ θð Þð Þ
 dH0
¼ 0
−βEV ′′ :ð Þ  1 þ rð Þ  −W 1 þ rð Þ þ πAθð Þð Þ  dC1
þ βEV ′′ :ð Þ  −W 1 þ rð Þ þ πAθð Þ2 þ βE V ′θð ÞπAA
   dA
þ βEV ′′ :ð Þ  −W 1þ rð Þ þ πAθð Þ  πH0θ þ βEV ′ θð ÞπAH0ð Þ  dH0
¼ 0
We now make two alternative assumptions for the sign of πAH0 . First (case A), we as-
sume that πAH0 ¼ 0, and second (case B), we assume that πAH0 > 0.
Case A. πAH0 ¼ 0
The total differential equations from above are
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U′′ C1ð Þ þ β 1þ rð Þ2EV ′′ :ð Þ
   dC1
þ β 1þ rð Þ2W  EV ′′ :ð Þ−β 1þ rð ÞπAEV ′′ θð Þ
   dA
¼ β 1 þ rð ÞπH0EV ′′ θð Þð Þ  dH0
−βEV ′′ :ð Þ  1 þ rð Þ  −W 1 þ rð Þ þ πAθð Þð Þ  dC1
þ βEV ′′ :ð Þ  −W 1 þ rð Þ þ πAθð Þ2 þ βE V ′θð ÞπAA
   dA
¼ βE V ′′θð Þ  πH0  −W 1þ rð Þ þ πAθð Þð Þ  dH0












a is U ′ ′ (C1) + β(1 + r)
2EV ′ ′ (.)
b is β(1 + r)2W · EV ′ ′ (.) − β(1 + r)πAEV ′ ′ (θ)
c is β 1 þ rð ÞπH0EV ′′ θð Þ
d is –βEV ′ ′ (.) · (1 + r) · (−W(1 + r) + πAθ)
e is βEV ′ ′ (.) · (−W(1 + r) + πAθ)
2 + βE(V ′ θ)πAA














where |H| = ae − bd > 0. This follows from the second-order conditions.




¼ sign −dcþ af
¼ βEV ′′ :ð Þ  1 þ rð Þ  −W 1 þ rð Þ þ πAθð Þ  β 1þ rð ÞπH0E V ′′θð Þ
þ U′′ C1ð Þ þ β 1þ rð Þ2  EV ′′ :ð Þ  βEV ′′ θð Þ  πH0  −πAθ þW 1þ rð Þð Þ

¼ β2EV ′′ :ð Þ  1 þ rð Þ2  E V ′′θð Þ  πH0  −W 1 þ rð Þ þ πAθð Þ þ U′′ C1ð Þ
 βE V ′′ θð Þð Þ  πH0
 −πAθ þW 1þ rð Þ þ β 1 þ rð Þ2  EV ′′ :ð Þ  βE V ′′θð Þ  πH0  W 1þ rð Þ−πAθð Þð

¼ U′′ C1ð Þ  βE V ′′ θð Þð Þ  πH0  −πAθ þW 1þ rð Þð Þ
The sign of the term E(V ′ ′ θ) · (W(1 + r) − πAθ) is derived as follows.
Using Arrow’s definition of absolute risk aversion (R):
R ¼ −V ′′
V 0
with R ′ < 0 for all C2 ≥ 0 (via the assumption of declining absolute risk aversion).
Define ~C2 to be the level of second period consumption that occurs if ~θ solves πAEV
′ C2 ~θ
 
¼ W 1 þ rð ÞEV ′ C2ð Þ, and define ~R to be the value of R at ~C2.
Given these definitions and the monotonicity of R and the concavity of π(.) implies
R > < ~R
 
⇔ W 1 þ rð Þ− πAθð Þ > < 0ð Þ
This implies the following:
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~R− R
   W 1 þ rð Þ − πAθð Þ < 0
V ′′ W 1 þ rð Þ− πAθð Þ < −V ′ ~R W 1 þ rð Þ− πAθð Þ
Taking expectations,
EV ′′ W 1 þ rð Þ− πAθð Þ < − ~REV ′ W 1 þ rð Þ− πAθð Þ
Right hand side of the above inequality is zero from the first-order conditions. Thus,
EV ′′ W 1 þ rð Þ− πAθð Þ < 0
This together with our equation derived before for
sign
dAð Þ
dH0ð Þ ¼ sign−dcþ af ¼ signβU} C1ð Þ  E V}θð Þ  π H0ð Þ





Case B. If πAH0 > 0
Again, rewriting the total differential equations derived previously, we have that
U′′ C1ð Þ þ β 1þ rð Þ2EV ′′ :ð Þ
   dC1 þ β 1þ rð Þ2WEV ′′ :ð Þ−β 1þ rð ÞπAEV ′′ θð Þ 
 dAþ −β 1 þ rð ÞπH0EV ′′ θð Þð Þ  dH0
¼ 0
−βEV ′′ :ð Þ  1 þ rð Þ  −W 1 þ rð Þ þ πAθð Þð Þ  dC1
þ βEV ′′ :ð Þ  −W 1 þ rð Þ þ πAθð Þ2 þ βE V 0θð ÞπAA
   dA
þ βEV ′′ :ð Þ  πH0  −W 1þ rð Þ þ πAθð Þ þ βE V 0θð ÞπAH0ð Þ  dH0
¼ 0
Rearranging terms in the above equations, we get that
U′′ C1ð Þ þ β 1þ rð Þ2EV ′′ :ð Þ
   dC1 þ β 1þ rð Þ2WEV ′′ :ð Þ−β 1þ rð ÞπAEV ′′ θð Þ 
 dA
¼ β 1 þ rð ÞπH0EV ′′ θð Þ  dH0
−βEV ′′ :ð Þ: 1 þ rð Þ: −W 1 þ rð Þ þ πAθð Þð Þ  dC1 þ βEV ′′ :ð Þ
 −W 1 þ rð Þ þ πAθð Þ2 þ βE V 0θð ÞπAAÞ  dA
¼ βEV ′′ :ð Þ  πH0  W 1þ rð Þ−πAθð Þ−βE V 0θð ÞπAH0ð Þ  dH0












a is U ′ ′ (C1) + β(1 + r)
2EV ′ ′ (.)
b is β(1 + r)2WEV ′ ′ (.) − β(1 + r)πAEV ′ ′ (θ)
c is β 1 þ rð ÞπH0EV ′′ θð Þ
d is − βEV ′ ′ (.) · (1 + r) · (−W(1 + r) + πAθ)
e is βEV ′ ′ (.) · (−W(1 + r) + πAθ)
2 + βE(V ' θ)πAA
f is βEV ′′ :ð Þ  πH0  W 1þ rð Þ−πAθð Þ−βE V 0θð ÞπAH0
This can be rewritten as follows:













where |H| = ae − bd > 0 from the second-order conditions.




¼ sign − dcþ af
¼ βEV ′′ :ð Þ  1þ rð Þ  −W 1þ rð Þ þ πAθð Þð Þ
 βE V ′′θð Þ  πH0  1þ rð Þð Þ þ U′′ C1ð Þ þ β 1þ rð Þ2EV ′′ :ð Þ
 
 βE V ′′θð Þ  πH0  W 1þ rð Þ−πAθð Þ−βE V 0θð ÞπAH0ð Þ
¼ U′′ C1ð Þ  β  E V ′′θð Þ  πH0  W 1þ rð Þ−πAθð Þ− U′′ C1ð Þ þ β 1þ rð Þ2EV ′′ :ð Þ
 
 βE V ′θð Þ  πAH0
The sign of the second term on the RHS of the equation above is negative from our
assumption of πAH0 > 0. Thus, even in the absence of risk,
dA
dH0
> 0. In other words, in
the absence of risk, the first term on the RHS will be zero but the second term on RHS
will be positive. Thus, there will be a positive correlation between health and educa-
tional investment. When there is risk, the first term on the RHS will be positive and
the correlation between education and health endowment will be exacerbated. This is
proven below.
From Arrow’s definition of absolute risk aversion,
R ¼ −V ′
V 0
with R ' < 0 for all C2 ≥ 0 (via the assumption of declining absolute risk aversion).
Also, define ~C2 to be the level of second period consumption that occurs if ~θ solves
πAEV 0 C2~θ
 
¼ W 1þ rð ÞEV ′ C2ð Þ, and define ~R to be the value of R at ~C2. Given these
definitions and the monotonicity of R and the concavity of π(.) implies
R > < ~R
 
⇔ W 1 þ rð Þ− πAθð Þ > < 0ð Þ
This implies the following:
~R− R
   W 1 þ rð Þ− πAθð Þ < 0
V} W 1 þ rð Þ − πAθð Þ < − V 0~R W 1 þ rð Þ− πAθð Þ
Taking expectations,
EV} W 1 þ rð Þ − πAθð Þ < − ~REV 0 W 1 þ rð Þ− πAθð Þ
Right hand side of the above inequality is zero from the first-order conditions. Thus,
EV} W 1 þ rð Þ− πAθð Þ < 0
This together with our equation derived before gives us that
sign βU′′ C1ð Þ  β  EV ′′  πH0  W 1þ rð Þ−πAθð Þ > 0
which implies that




6.2 Proof of proposition 3
MaxC1; M U C1ð Þ þ βEV Y þW 1−Að Þ−C1ð Þ  1 þ rð Þ þ π M;D0ð Þθð Þ
The first-order conditions (FOCs) are as follows:
U 0 C1ð Þ −β 1 þ rð ÞEV 0 C2ð Þ ¼ 0
βEV 0 C2ð Þ  −W 1 þ rð Þ þ πMθð Þ ¼ 0
Totally differentiating the above FOCs with respect to C1, M, and D0, we get
U′′ C1ð Þ þ β 1þ rð Þ2EV ′′ C2ð Þ
   dC1
þ −β 1þ rð ÞπAEV ′′ C2ð Þ  ð−W 1þ rð Þ þ πMθð Þ  dM
þ −β 1 þ rð ÞEV ′′ C2ð Þ:πD0θð Þ  dD0
¼ 0
−βEV ′′ C2ð Þ  1 þ rð Þ  −W 1 þ rð Þ þ πMθð Þð Þ  dC1
þ βEV ′′ C2ð Þ  −W 1 þ rð Þ þ πMθð Þ2 þ βE V ′C2ð ÞπMM θ
   dM
þ βEV ′′ C2ð Þ  −W 1þ rð Þ þ πMθð Þ  πD0θ þ βEV ′ C2ð ÞπMD0θð Þ  dD0
¼ 0
For simplicity of analysis, assume that πMD0 ¼ 0. The total differential equations can
thus be expressed as follows:
U′′ C1ð Þ þ β 1þ rð Þ2EV ′′ C2ð Þ
   dC1
þ −β 1þ rð ÞπAEV ′′ C2ð Þ  ð−W 1þ rð Þ þ πMθð Þ  dM
¼ β 1 þ rð ÞEV ′′ C2ð Þ  πD0θð Þ  dD0
βEV ′′ C2ð Þ  1 þ rð Þ  −W 1 þ rð Þ þ πMθð Þð Þ  dC1
þ βEV ′′ C2ð Þ  −W 1 þ rð Þ þ πMθð Þ2 þ βE V ′θð ÞπMM θ
   dM
¼ βEV ′′ C2ð Þ  W 1þ rð Þ−πMθð Þ  πD0θð Þ  dD0



























Hj j  −dcþ afð Þ
where |H| = ae − bd > 0 from the second-order conditions.




¼ sign −dcþ afð Þ
where
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−dcþ af ¼ βEV ′′ C2ð Þ  1 þ rð Þ  −W 1 þ rð Þ þ πMθð Þð Þ
 β 1þ rð ÞEV ′′ C2ð ÞπD0θð Þþ
U′′ C1ð Þ þ β 1þ rð Þ2EV ′′ C2ð Þ
   βEV ′′ C2ð Þ −πMθ þW 1 þ rð Þð ÞπD0θð Þ
¼ U′′ C1ð ÞβEV ′′ C2ð Þ −πMθ þW 1 þ rð ÞπD0θð
Sign of this term can be determined as follows. We use Arrow’s definition of absolute risk
aversion as noted in earlier proofs. Let the value of R which clears the first-order conditions
under risk be denoted ~R. R is monotonically decreasing in consumption and the risk param-
eter θ. This together with the first-order conditions gives us
R > < ~R
 
⇔ W 1 þ rð Þ− πMθð Þ > < 0ð Þ
This implies the following:
~R− R
   W 1 þ rð Þ− πMθð Þ < 0
V} W 1 þ rð Þ − πMθð Þ < − V 0~R W 1 þ rð Þ− πMθð Þ
Taking expectations,
EV} W 1 þ rð Þ − πMθð Þ < − ~REV 0 W 1 þ rð Þ− πMθð Þ
Right hand side of the above inequality is zero from the first-order conditions. Thus,
EV} W 1 þ rð Þ − πMθð Þ < 0




¼ sign d−eð Þ ¼ sign U′′ C1ð ÞβEV ′′πD0 −πMθ þW 1 þ rð Þð Þð




This result shows that those with higher cognitive ability will receive more investment
in their health.
6.3 Proof of proposition 5
MaxC1; A U C1ð Þ þ βEV Y þW 1−Að Þ−C1ð Þ  1 þ rð Þ þ π f Að Þ þ Hθð Þð Þ
The first-order conditions are the following:
U 0 C1ð Þ −β 1 þ rð ÞEV 0 C2ð Þ ¼ 0
βEV 0 :ð Þ  −W 1 þ rð Þ þ π0f 0ð Þ ¼ 0
Totally differentiating the above first-order conditions, we get the following:
U′′ C1ð Þ þ β 1þ rð Þ2EV ′′ :ð Þ
   dC1 þ −β 1þ rð ÞEV ′′ C2ð Þ  −W 1þ rð Þ þ πf f A  
dAþ −β 1 þ rð ÞEV ′′θ:πH0ð Þ  dH0 ¼ 0
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−βEV ′′ :ð Þ  1 þ rð Þ  −W 1 þ rð Þ þ πf f A
    dC1
þ βEV ′′ :ð Þ  −W 1 þ rð Þ þ πf f A
 2 þ βEV ′ :ð Þπff f A2
 
 dAþ βEV ′′ :ð Þ  −W 1þ rð Þ þ πf f A
   πH0θ   dH0 ¼ 0












a is U ′ ′ (C1) + β(1 + r)
2EV ′ ′ (.)
b is − β(1 + r)EV ′ ′ (C2) · (−W(1 + r) + πffA)
c is β 1 þ rð ÞEV ′′θ  πH0
d is − βEV ′ ′ (.) · (1 + r) · (−W(1 + r) + πffA)
e is (βEV ′ ′ (.) · (−W(1 + r) + πffA)
2 + βEV ′ (.)πff fA
2 )
f is βEV ′′ :ð Þ  −W 1þ rð Þ þ πf f A
   πH0θ




Hj j  −dcþ afð Þ




¼ sign −dcþ afð Þ
where
−dcþ af ¼ βEV ′′ :ð Þ  1 þ rð Þ  −W 1 þ rð Þ þ πf f A
    ðβ 1 þ rð Þð ÞEV ′′ θð Þ
 πH0 þ U′′ C1ð Þ þ β 1þ rð Þ2EV ′′ :ð Þ
 
 βEV ′′ :ð Þ  W 1þ rð Þ−πf f A
   πH0θ 
¼ U} C1ð Þ  βEV} :ð Þ  W 1þ rð Þ−πf f A
   πH0θ
Let the value of R which clears the first-order conditions under risk be denoted ~R . R
is monotonically decreasing in consumption and the risk parameter θ. This together
with the first-order conditions gives us
R > < ~R
 
⇔ W 1 þ rð Þ− πf f A
 
< > 0ð Þ
This implies the following:
~R− R
   W 1 þ rð Þ− πf f A  > 0
V} W 1 þ rð Þ − πf f A
 
− πf f AÞ > − RV ′ W 1 þ rð Þ − πf f A
 
Taking expectations;
EV} W 1 þ rð Þ− πf f A
 
> − ~REV 0 W 1 þ rð Þ− πf f A
 
Right hand side of the above inequality is zero from the first-order conditions. Thus,
EV} W 1 þ rð Þ − πf f A
 
> 0
From the previous derivation, we know that




¼ sign −dcþ afð Þ ¼ sign U′′ C1ð Þ  βEV ′′ :ð Þ  W 1þ rð Þ−πf f A





as from our assumption of diminishing marginal utility, U ′ ′ (C1) < 0
6.4 Proof of proposition 7
MaxA; M U Y þW 1−A−Mð Þð Þ þ βEV π A;Hð Þθð Þ
H ¼ H0 þ I M;H0ð Þ
The first-order conditions are given as follows:
−W  U′ C1ð Þ þ βEV 0 C2θð ÞπA ¼ 0
−W  U′ C1ð Þ þ βEV 0 C2θð ÞπH IM ¼ 0
Totally differentiating the FOCs wrt A, M, and H0, we get
W 2  U′′ C1ð Þ þ βEV ′′ C2θð ÞπA2
 	  dA
þ W 2  U′′ C1ð Þ þ βEV ′′ C2θð ÞπAπHIM
 	  dM
þ βEV ′′ C2θð ÞπAπH 1þ IH0ð Þ½  dH0 ¼ 0
W 2  U′′ C1ð Þ þ βEV ′′ C2θð ÞπAπHIM
 	  dA
þ W 2  U′′ C1ð Þ þ βEV ′′ C2θð ÞπH 2IM2
 	
dM þ βEV ′′ C2θð ÞπH 2IM 1þ IH0ð Þ
 	  dH0 ¼ 0











Equating the first and second first-order conditions, we get the optimality condition













By the second-order conditions for a local optima, we get that H > 0
From Arrow’s definition of absolute risk aversion,
R ¼ −V}
V 0
with R ' < 0 for all C2 ≥ 0 (via the assumption of declining absolute risk aversion).
Let the value of R which clears the first-order conditions under risk be denoted ~R . R
is monotonically decreasing in consumption and the risk parameter θ. This together
with the first-order conditions gives us
R > < ~R
 
⇔ πHIM− πAð Þθ > < 0ð Þ
implies
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~R− R
   πHIM− πAð Þθ < 0
V ′′ πHIM− πAð Þθ < − ~RV 0 πHIM− πAð Þθ
Taking expectations,
EV} πHIM− πAð Þθð Þ > − ~REV 0 πHIM− πAð Þθð Þ
Right hand side of the above inequality is zero from the first-order conditions. Thus,
EV} πHIM− πAð Þθð Þ > 0




¼ sign c e−bð Þ
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